No conflict with the info here, just extra information for the interested.
While certainly impressive, Maya's AA capabilities was still not as good as a designed-for-the-purpose AA Cruiser, the Atlanta-class Light Cruiser (technically, large scout destroyer flotilla leader).
And now for another installment of Grand_Zero's Fleet Analysis, or "Why the US Navy will never be implemented into Kancolle, for fear of destabilizing the entire game balance. With your host, Grand_Zero."
Let's begin.
Firstly, a brief explanation. Naval Anti-Air Warfare, surface-to-air specifically, is considered a 'numbers game', even to this day. Basically, the numbers mean almost everything. In AA, there are Three Major number categories: [Detection], [Response], and [Practical Firepower]. [Detection] is how far and how accurately the ship can detect the air target, primarily determined by the strength of their radar. [Response] is the reaction time of the Guns/Launchers and Crew of the ship. Factors such as Crew Competency, Moral, Traveling Positions of the Guns/Launchers, and the Training and Elevation rates of the Guns/Launchers themselves. Due to evaluating the crew themselves, this is the hardest category to calculate, so in most cases they just assume that all crews are perfect and expect the real number to be lower. [Practical Firepower] is, by all means, the simplest concept to grasp. It is comprised of [Broadside Throw Weight per Minute] (or 'Effective Power', in the case of missiles), [Accuracy], [Reliability], and [Dud Ratio].
Since, for the most part, much of this is relatively boring; we'll just skip to the 'fun' part. Raw Power, Broadside Throw Weight per Minute (B-TW/min). (...Aside, everything else is skewed in favor of the Americans anyway... believe me, I looked.)
Now, B-TW/min is determined by the gun's [Practical Rate of Fire] and [Projective Weight]. There's a reason that there's such a thing a 'Maximum Broadside' (which is all guns at test rate or fire, and almost never achievable in real battle). So, let's get into it. (this is all in US/Imperial, sorry for the SI users that don't understand it)
Maya's Guns
6x "5/40cal Dual-Purpose in Dual Enclosed Mounts [alt] Practical Rate of Fire: ~8rd/min (common) Projectile Weight: 50.7lbs Broadside: 3 guns Sub-B-TW/min: 1216.8lbs/min - - - - 39x 25mm/60cal Medium AA in Triple Gun turrets [alt] Practical Rate of Fire: ~110rd/min (common) Projectile Weight: 0.552lbs (.6) Broadside: 21guns Sub-B-TW/min: 1275.12lbs/min - - - - 9x 25mm/60cal Medium AA on Single Gun Mount [alt] Practical Rate of Fire: ~110rd/min (common) Projectile Weight: 0.552lbs (~0.6lb) Broadside: 5 guns Sub-B-TW/min: 303.6lbs/min - - - - 36x 13mm/76cal Light AA on Single Gun Mounts [alt] Practical Rate of Fire: ~250rd/min (common) Projectile Weight: 0.114lb (1.84oz) Broadside: 18 guns (best estimate, the 'schematics' I obtained were a bit fuzzy) Sub-B-TW/min: 513lbs/min
Maya's Effective B-TW/min: 3308.52min
Not particularly bad per se, compared to the AA suite of the ships of most other navies it was actually quite good. Just not up against the Americans.
And now our contender steps into the ring! USS Atlanta III (CL-51), aka the 'unluckiest ship ever' (even though she wasn't). Note, that she was not as powerful as her little sister, USS Oakland II (CL-95), also a Atlanta-class.
Atlanta's Guns
16x 5in/38cal Mark 12 Dual-Purpose in Dual Enclosed Mounts Practical Rate of Fire: ~15rd/min (common) Projectile Weight: 55.18lbs Broadside: 14 guns Sub-B-TW/min: 11587.8lbs/min - - - - 16x 1.1in/75cal Mark 1 Medium AA in Quad-Mounts Practical Rate of Fire: ~100rd/min (common) Projectile Weight: 0.917lbs Broadside: 12 guns Sub-B-TW/min: 1100.4lbs/min - - - - 8x 20mm/70cal Mark 2 (Oerlikon) Light AA on Single Pedestal Mounts Practical Rate of Fire: ~250rd/min Projectile Weight: 0.271lbs Broadside: 4 Sub-B-TW/min: 271.4lb/min
Atlanta's Effective B-TW/min: 12959.6lbs Or almost 4 times as much AA firepower as Maya. In fact, she has roughly the same AA firepower as the Yamato (Ten-Go), not counting Sankaidan (given their only marginal effectiveness, they really didn't come into play much at all). In fact, only the American post-treaty Battleships out and out stomp the Atlanta class...
However, it gets worse. All Essex-class Fleet Carriers had better AA, in fact USS Kidd (DD-447), a Fletcher-class Destroyer, had more AA firepower... See here.
Kidd's Guns
5x 5in/38cal Mark 12 Dual-Purpose in Single Enclosed Mounts Practical Rate of Fire: 15rd/min (Common) [Note: Technically, this should be upped to about 20, which was the common combat output for the Fletcher-class, which earned them the nickname "Heavy AA Machine Guns" by the Japanese. Even though it is the same gun as those used by the Atlanta, the single mount allowed much greater room for the crew to operate efficiently, thus increasing fire rate drastically. However, in the spirit of fairness, I have left it at 15rd/min.] Projectile Weight: 55.18lb Broadside: 5 guns Sub-B-TW/min: 4138.5lb/min - - - - 8x 40mm/56cal Mark 1 and Mark 2 (Bofors) Medium AA in Quad-Mounts Practical Rate of Fire: 120rd/min (nominal) Projectile Weight: 1.985lb Broadside: 4 guns Sub-B-TW/min: 952.8lb/min - - - - 6x 40mm/56cal Mark 1 and Mark 2 (Bofors) Medium AA in Dual-Mounts Practical Rate of Fire: 120rd/min (nominal) Projectile Weight: 1.985lb Broadside: 4 guns Sub-B-TW/min: 952.8lb/min - - - - 12x 20mm/70cal Mark 2 (Oerlikon) Light AA in Dual-Mounts Practical Rate of Fire: ~250rd/min Projectile Weight: 0.271lbs Broadside: 6 Sub-B-TW/min: 406.5lb/min
Kidd's Effective B-TW/min: 6857.1lb...
Yeah. The US not only had the strongest Air Power in the War, we also had the strongest Anti-Air Power in the war. Note that this isn't even getting into our superior Radar, Fire Control, Gun Reliability, and Dud Ratio, which just makes everything that much worse for Maya.
... And that has been it for this installment of "Why the US Navy will never be implemented into Kancolle, for fear of destabilizing the entire game balance. With your host, Grand_Zero." I hope you enjoyed the text-dump.
(P.S: I hope no one thinks I dislike Sakazaki Freddy's works. On the contrary, I like them a lot and find them very interesting.)
Then what about the another Atlanta-class USS San Diego CL-53?
Oh, we also have San Juan, Oakland, Reno, Flint and Tucson, I'm sure they were fitted with even more anti-aircraft guns during the duration of the war.
One client satisfied with her upgrade despite initial complaints. Work done for the fairy.
grand_zero said:
(P.S: I hope no one thinks I dislike Sakazaki Freddy's works. On the contrary, I like them a lot and find them very interesting.)
Seeing that heâs the artist who most often make comic with the history reference, thereâs really not much other posts to write those information and staying in context. Speaking about specs and gun equipment in romance themed comic is too much out of place ^^;
Then what about the another Atlanta-class USS San Diego CL-53?
Oh, we also have San Juan, Oakland, Reno, Flint and Tucson, I'm sure they were fitted with even more anti-aircraft guns during the duration of the war.
I'll exclude Juneau since she was sunk in action.
USS San Diego II (CL-53)?
Early Life, she was the same as Atlanta (except much better luck). Late 1943, her 16 1.1in 'Chicago Pianos' were replaced with 8 (yes, just 8, meaning only 6 per broadside) 40mm Bofors. However, faster fire rate and double the projectile weight more than made up for the difference (along side much greater gun reliability, although every problem with the Piano had already been weeded out by then...). Comparing, the 16 1.1in guns gave 1100.4lb/min, whereas the 40mm Bofors provided 1429.2lb/min, increasing her B-TW/min to 13288.4lbs (hardly noticeable when only comparing throw weight, but dropping the dud/jam ratio from 12.8% to 2.3% has a very noticeable impact on the battlefield).
You ought to know something, the late-war New Jersey II and late-war San Diego II, working together, theoretically could have taken on all of Task Force 38/58's carriers alone and likely won. Of course, that's what one has to expect from some of the most decorated warships in history...
The Oakland-class (subclass of the Atlanta-class, but so similar that people called them the Atlanta-Oakland-class) actually removed guns, and lowered their firepower.
See...
Atlanta-Oakland-class' Guns
12x 5in/38cal Mark 12 Dual-Purpose in Dual Enclosed Mounts Practical Rate of Fire: ~15rd/min (common) Projectile Weight: 55.18lbs Broadside: 12 guns Sub-B-TW/min: 9932.4lb/min - - - - 8x 40mm/56cal Mark 1 and Mark 2 (Bofors) Medium AA in Dual-Mounts Practical Rate of Fire: 120rd/min (nominal) Projectile Weight: 1.985lb Broadside: 6 guns Sub-B-TW/min: 1429.2lb/min - - - - 14x 20mm/70cal Mark 2 (Oerlikon) Light AA on Single Pedestal Mounts Practical Rate of Fire: ~250rd/min Projectile Weight: 0.271lbs Broadside: 7 Sub-B-TW/min: 474.25lb/min
Effective B-TW/min: 11835.85lbs. A decrease in throw weight of 1123.75lbs/min.
In addition, they also were very top-heavy and not very sea-stable. The Oakland-class were also unable to get to the same speed as the earlier Atlanta-class ships, losing about 3 entire knots and having to pull out whenever encountering high sea-states. Why did they do this? Range. The 5in/38cal were excellent at Long Range, but were inadequate at shorter ranges when compared to the machine guns... they thought. The thing is though, initially they were right. The 40mm excelled in short and intermediate range encounters, especially when radar-controlled. However, come 1944/45 and they'd find that the 20mm and 40mm did a bunch of nothing against Kamikazis, and the 5in/38cals were being used to great effect at nearly point-blank range... Welp. Hindsight is 20/20, foresight is naught.
Ah, thank you for your answer, I never thought you'll reply to my question since weaponry is not my field of expertise, anyway I will always appreciate your answer.
Ah, thank you for your answer, I never thought you'll reply to my question since weaponry is not my field of expertise, anyway I will always appreciate your answer.
Oh, it's no problem. I usually try to respond to any reply to mine, should I have half an idea what to say.
Naval Gunnery is merely an interest of mine, even though I screw up the ballistics something serious.
Honestly, I've learned a lot reading your comments, so I've been enjoying this.
You ought to know something, the late-war New Jersey II and late-war San Diego II, working together, theoretically could have taken on all of Task Force 38/58's carriers alone and likely won.
Haha, no, not even close. So not close that the moon is a next door neighbor by comparison.
Haha, no, not even close. So not close that the moon is a next door neighbor by comparison.
Really? What makes you say that? No, seriously. What makes you say that.
Lunatic6, whom I was speaking to, has already read my reasons in a different post. Thus I didn't feel it was necessary to reiterate what I had already said, I just added some extra info for him(?).
Now, I'm giving you a chance to make your argument. So, let's hear your reasoning, before I bother devoting any more time to you. Not saying you're not worth it, of course. You just haven't given me anything to react to aside from an apparent lack of appropriate comparisons.
Really? What makes you say that? No, seriously. What makes you say that.
Lunatic6, whom I was speaking to, has already read my reasons in a different post. Thus I didn't feel it was necessary to reiterate what I had already said, I just added some extra info for him(?).
Now, I'm giving you a chance to make your argument. So, let's hear your reasoning, before I bother devoting any more time to you. Not saying you're not worth it, of course. You just haven't given me anything to react to aside from an apparent lack of appropriate comparisons.
The fact that US Navy studies conducted from October 1944-Mar 1945 determined it took an average of 550 VT fused 5" shells to destroy one aircraft while the average ship carried between 400 and 500 5" rounds per barrel. Assuming that the two ships magically attain that max effectiveness and fire every last round they have on board even as they're being riddled by strafing, bombs, rockets, and torpedoes which are slaughtering gun crews, destroying radars, and knocking out gun mounts they could expect to destroy, perhaps 30 aircraft with their 5 inch guns.
The same study gave a kill rate for the 40mm Bofors of about 4,500 rounds per plane average stowage per barrel for the 40mm on US ships was about 2,000 rounds. So using the same ludicrously generous conditions let's say every two 40mms barrels account for one aircraft during the battle. The San Diego tacks on a measly four extra plans, the denser "point defense" of the battleship adds perhaps 40 with with it's 80 odd barrels.
I couldn't find numbers for 20mm rounds carried, so I'm just going to do assume it's a similar ratio of 5" to 40mm and quadruple it, so say 8,000 rounds per gun (this would actually fit somewhat with the supposed 9,000 round barrel life too actually). The study cited above indicated a pathetic 30,000 rounds per kill with the 20mmm. So say one plane for every three 20mm mounts. The Atlanta adds another four or so and the Battleship say fifteen.About 30+35+19 = 84 planes destroyed assuming historic kill rates and ignoring the effects of cumulative damage and disabled guns (utterly stupid in this situation). Quite simply these two ships physically cannot carry enough ammo to disable even 1/10th of TF38s aircraft.
At face value, you'd be correct. However, there are a few problems here.
First off, I'm going to point out right away that that all of this is coming directly from my memory, which anybody who knows me at all can tell you isn't the best in the world. But I'm pretty sure I'm getting most of this right. Also, I was tired as I wrote this and it shows. Especially as it drags on. I had a busy day, forgive me. Someone like GAU-8/A would likely provide better details.
Long, drawn out, wall of text
The studies in 44/45 assumed sporadic mass attacks from varied land bases. After all, most of the IJN Carriers or their Planes had been sunk/splashed by this point and land bases are pretty much all Japan had left (their carrier fleet was even used as a distraction, carrying virtually no planes). Another factor is that their results were averages, as in for the entire fleet. They were not considering the individual success rates of the ships or even ship types, instead going for the results of the entire fleet of 5in/38cal, 40mm, and 20mm, including the less capable destroyers and carriers. I would like to point out that most of these did not have Radar Controlled AA Guns, unlike both New Jersey and San Diego (carriers did, of course). The ratios for the Iowa-class were closer to 100 5in shots to a splash. They really just didn't fire them that much, not needing to (regardless, they spent hundreds of thousands of combined man-hours training for it). San Diego managed to maintain a consistent 150, even without radar assistance. She also had a reputation for turning any enemy plane that got within ~5000 yards of her turned into a fireball, post haste. There's a reason that her nickname was the 'Hell-Hound of Guadalcanal' (Of course, these are probable kills, not confirmed kills. Ppoi.).
Anyway, in an AA battle the circumstances of the battle are almost as important as the combatants. Verses land based planes, attacks could come from any direction, at any time, and their flight patterns and load-outs were entirely unpredictable. Not to mention that when closing in on land masses, AA Radar was severely hampered. After all, Radar does not help you that much if the enemy plane is hiding in the shadow of an island or riding nap-of-the-earth.
Against Carriers, the game changes. There are a few major weaknesses of Carriers that one has to consider. Firstly, a Carrier can only support so many planes in the air at a single time Secondly, they can only launch very few aircraft per sortie, and it can take up to half an hour to launch another sortie. Thirdly, WW2 Carriers can not be at full speed while launching or receiving planes. Fourthly, Carrier Plane flight patterns are predictable. Very predictable. Especially at short range to the carrier. Fifthly, Carriers are extremely weak in a Melee and incapable of sinking anything larger than a destroyer on their own. Sixthly, their Radar units are generally only as good as their counterpart Battleship's, including AA radar. This gave them surface detection out to about 22nmi against a battleship sized target or 26nmi against an Aircraft Carrier. Seventhly, in WW2 their CAP was only effective out to about ~40nmi (eyeball accurate detection range). Outside of that, they're practically blind.
I suppose I'm not making much sense. Let me go into more detail. Let's call TF38/58 'Blue Team' and the New Jersey and San Diego 'Red Team', for simplicity's sake.
Blue Team was comprised of 9 Fleet Carriers and 9 Light Carriers. For the purposes of this discussion, let's assume that they were 9 Essex-class and 9 Independence-class. They weren't, this is in fact giving them an advantage. (Saratoga and Enterprise were both part of TF38/58)
Each Carrier could only launch 2 planes per sortie, and took roughly 25 minutes to do it, or 10 to 15 in 'burst' mode (by the way, this is fast compared to today's carriers). Note also that this was including Spotted planes, which were already on deck. FYI, 'burst' had a very high chance of breaking the catapults, which (being delicate hydraulics) needed a chance to cool off after being fired (bare minimum of 15 minutes). Fighters could take off on their own (still takes time though, but they could get quite a few of those in the air in one cycle), heavy bombers... ehh, not so much. This flaw was only improved on the Midway and post-war retrofit Essex classes, but by then they removed the hydraulics in favor of the much more reliable steam powered catapult. Broken catapults means at least an hour and a half to repair it... that is, an hour and a half with the runway clear (which is not the entirety of the flight deck). It took roughly 5 to 10 minutes to receive up to two planes (depending on the pilots' skill levels, there was more than one incident of a pilot bringing their plane down in entirely the wrong area, which slows everything down). CAP for Blue Team was about 20 to 50 planes, but most (if not all) of those were bomb-less fighters (as compared to fighter-bombers, which were the same but given bombs). Fighters, without bombs, are next to useless against armored surface ships. Both Big J and San Diego would be virtually immune to the fighters (although, admittedly, their AA crews and Radar Arrays would not be).
This meant that, in order to actually attack and do damage to the Battleship, they would have to launch a wave of bombers. Now, assuming that the entire fleet was entirely coordinated with one another and were not in the process of recovering one of their CAP (they almost always were), this would put about 18 Dive Bombers, and 18 Torpedo Bombers into the air in 25 minutes from contact. The carriers would need to maintain about 15 to 20kn to achieve this reliably (fast speeds slow down launch times, even though it actually helps the launch itself).
However, they already have a problem. Detection itself. Here, Red Team has the advantage with New Jersey's SK Air Search Radar being perfectly capable of detecting lone Fighter Planes at 75nmi, or masses at upwards of 120nmi. Masses includes Blue Team's CAP. Even flying in a 5 nmi loop. This is beyond visual range, mind, even for the planes. The commander of Red Team would have ample time to strategize and plot with his captains before taking any action. ... Naturally, the sensible thing to do in this case would be to hightail it out of there, but that wouldn't give us our conflict, so we'll assume that Red Team's side is in dire straits and that they decide to go for broke. This also assumes that they are fully equipped and freshly resupplied, of course. So, no retreat, we're going for the dirtiest tricks in the book. Which, by the way, happens to be the New Jersey's forte. ('Department of Dirty Tricks', and all that.)
In this scenario, the best option for Red Team would be to try for a head on pass at Blue Team, coming from their bearing. In other words, play chicken with them. The idea is that, if Red Team is to have any hope of defeating Blue Team, they need to get in there and do it fast. If Red Team and Blue Team enter a Melee, Red Team has the aforementioned likely chance of winning. Of course, getting there is the problem.
Starting at Red Team's Detection Range of 120nmi and moving at top speed, Red Team's 33kn and Blue Team's... say 20kn (to work with their CAP), contact (40nmi) would be in 89 minutes.
Naturally, Red Team could just charge in. Believe it or not, they actually stand a fair chance of not facing anything more than 36 bombers and up to 50 fighters (or 'flys' as the Jersey crew called them). Well within their historic capabilities, considering that they'd have the first strike advantage and would be virtually ignoring the fighters (any gunner who was incapable of identifying his target would have been quickly relieved of his position). Acknowledging that they can actually do damage to Red Team's radar arrays, they actually have less than a 3% chance of hitting them given their respective mass and general chaos. However, instead, Red Team will be making a desperate ploy in order to finagle an advantage. From Red Team's starting position (120nmi out, on line with Blue Team), the New Jersey will launch its scout planes. Curtiss SC Seahawks, since we are using the late-war New Jersey. These scout planes would fly a very low (and dangerous) course to flank Blue Team, riding the shadow of the earth (Radar's Blind Spot) the entire distance. When Red Team is at 55 to 60nmi from Blue Team, 54 minutes, the Scout Planes will ascend to Contact range, about 60nmi on Blue Team's opposite side. With any luck, Blue Team (who are still unaware of Red Team) will confuse the scouts with scouts from a land base or carrier fleet (since many Air Patrol groups operated in groups of three) and respond. Considering the cautious but aggressive style of both Admiral Mitscher and Admiral McCain, they wouldn't have bought it in full (the Japanese probably would have), however, there's a sizable chance that they would still respond. Diverting away the attention of the CAP and, potentially, putting fighters at the front of the flight row. The idea is to make Blue Team weary of running in that direction, given the possibility of enemy air power in that area (of course, this ruse would only work for a few minutes, but that's all the time Red Team needs). The scouts, at this point were on their own. Most likely, they'd go low and run, hiding out on an island somewhere until things quieted down. 18 minutes later, 40nmi distance, Blue Team's remaining CAP will detect Red Team. At this point, 20 to 50 Fighters may or may not move in to try a harassment strategy (tantamount to suicide) and 36 Bombers would be in the air in only 30 minutes, once they got the fighters out of the way, that is. Only making contact with one battleship and a cruiser, it's unlikely that the commander of Blue Team would drastically change course, instead gradually making a 40-degree turn until they could get a flight of planes off. Red Team would naturally continually adjust course to continue their charge. 5 and a half minutes later, 36nmi distance, interception. Red Team would break from their charge turning 20 degrees into Blue Team's heading, and begins engaging the initial air wave. New Jersey would in 1 minute also begin utilizing 16in HC/VT-AA rounds to intercept enemy aircraft at extended range. These rounds proved lethally effective in the Great Mariana's Turkey Shoot, having a reported 53% effectiveness. Albeit, very expensive. (Tip: Don't say they're not real. Battleship buffs everywhere will laugh at you.) This will continue for 5 and a half minutes, range 26nmi. New Jersey will begin detecting individual carriers, and cease AA operations with her main cannons, instead opting to begin shelling the carriers with HC-VT. Yes. The 16" was capable of throwing shells that far, just not accurate enough for BB vs BB combat. Against a carrier group however, this is not a problem. In all likelihood, several of the bombers may well be destroyed on the flight deck or just barely in the air. Blue Team would scatter, only 28 bombers make it into the air, 16 dive bombers and 12 torpedo bombers. By this point, it is possible that Red Team may be roughed up a bit, but I would expect no major casualties for them. On the other hand, Blue Team would likely have lost 3 or 4 aircraft by now, possibly 8 or more. Likelihood of Red Team victory about 50%, I'm guessing. 3 minutes later. Practical Engagement range is reached for the New Jersey. New Jersey would focus on engaging the carriers directly, San Diego would primarily attempt to provide Anti-Air cover for the New Jersey. Red Team as a whole will continue to approach as close as reasonable to the carriers. This could be achieved in 10 minutes. It's now confusion and chaos, everybody is within range of everybody. The teams would be in Melee, and Red Team's likelihood of victory has risen to roughly 65%.
Hint: 5in shells do next to nothing to Red Team, but make swiss cheese out of unarmored carriers. 16in HC/VT not only takes chunks out of the carrier, but ruins planes and disorients pilots. Carrier planes need somewhere to land and rearm, they only get one shot. As each plane expends it payload, it becomes virtually useless for anything but strafing runs until it can find an open carrier. As the battle prolongs, Red Team's chances of victory only rise.
The the very least, Red Team manages to sink several carriers before going down in a blaze of glory. Strategic Victory achieved. Technically, they still won.
While an interesting scenario, though I don't have a dog in this fight, so to speak, looking over it there are some assumptions that I think bear questioning.
First off, the studies cited by Tk3997 didn't assume anything about where attacks would come from, they were entirely analyses of previous attacks. In addition, destroyers did in fact have radar-directed 5"/38 and 40mm guns - the Mk.37 GFCS was installed on destroyers as far back as the Sims class, and the Mk.49/Mk.51 for 40mm was installed on destroyers as well (pictured: Mk.11/19 radar on USS Hall, Fletcher-class ). 20mm Oerlikons were never radar-controlled, but the Mk.14 gyroscopic sight, which installed directly on the gun mount, was not by any means restricted to larger vessels.
Second, strike aircraft could and did take off without catapult assistance from carriers. (SBDs, TBFs/TBMs, and SB2Cs preparing to do or doing exactly that.) Laden TBF/TBM Avengers could take off by themselves in only about 450 feet, little over half the length of an Essex-class. Of course heavy bombers could not operate off carriers unassisted, because heavy bombers - i.e. the class of aircraft typified by the B-17 or B-24 - could not operate off carriers at all. In any case, weight was not the problem, otherwise the roughly 75,000-pound KC-130F that took off from Forrestal in 1963 (in about 450ft) would have been in a bit of trouble. In the relevant areas, such as power/weight ratio and especially wing loading, carrier-borne strike aircraft were comparable to fighters - while suffering in comparison in power/weight ratio, both the SBD and TBF/TBM actually had substantially lower wing loadings than the F6F.
In addition, the given contact time assumes that, despite having zero idea that Red Team is there (or apparently so much as exists), Blue Team nonetheless happens to be steaming directly towards them. Any other angle extends time until contact, up to over 6 hours if the carriers are steaming directly away, which is equally likely. Also, carriers could and did conduct aircraft operations at higher speeds than 20 knots - Lexington and Yorktown launched at 30kts during Coral Sea, with Lexington also recovering at 25kts, and TF16 launched at 25kts during Midway. While it may be true that this would slow aircraft operations, this would be more than made up for by the ability to run away at 25-30 knots, further slowing the closing speed. In any case, carriers would (should, in any case) not blithely steam towards a gunfight with any force of large surface combatants. (This closing time also assumes, although more reasonably, that Red Team loses negligible time to evasive maneuvering or machinery damage from air attack.)
Every figure I've come across gives the maximum (not effective, maximum at 45-degree elevation) range of the 16" Mk.7 as little over 20nmi, not 26, but I'll give that figure the benefit of the doubt. However, in either case, even at 39,500 yards (19.5nmi), an HC shell's time of flight is already 86 seconds. Before impact, a long-hull Essex-class carrier doing 20 knots has covered its own length over 3 times and an Independence-class well over 4. In addition, even with the 1980s DR-810 FCS, pattern spread (this time at only 34,000 yards) was 200m, larger than an Independence-class CV side-on and 75% the size of an Essex-class, again side-on. (Head-on, as in the scenario, a 200m spread is 4.5x the maximum beam of an Essex and 6x for an Independence.) This makes any hits at this range luck-based - indeed, a WWII-era study estimated that at the still-lower range of 30,000 yards (14.8nmi), an Iowa would achieve only a 2.7% hit percentage against a broadside Bismarck-sized target.
A minor point, in addition to assuming negligible damage from the carrier air wings on approach, the scenario assumes no aircraft go suicide, despite its provision for "dirty tricks". Given the better training of US aviators compared to late-war IJN, they would likely be more effective than the real kamikazes, although I'm certainly not saying they would be particularly effective; just something to bear in mind.
Finally, I'm going to have to question the possibility of strategic victory in a context-less what-if scenario. While the presence of external factors has been alluded to, the highly hypothetical nature of this scenario renders them essentially irrelevant, as by its nature as a duel neither side has a meaningful existence beyond the immediate force and their goal of "kill the other force." (Blue Team demonstrates this with its apparent secondary goal of "steam around blindly and unescorted.") Of course, either side could achieve a tactical victory just by damage done. However, without any external strategy or events that this duel would affect, essentially by definition there is no possibility of a strategic victory for any side, and even if these do exist, they're never specified and can't be factored in.
Cheers and no animosity taken I hope, as I rather enjoy this kind of discussion (well, I suppose I've made that evident enough), actually.
Edit: Also, please excuse my rudeness if I don't reply to any responses; I'll read them but making posts like this just takes up far too much time.
Actually, what I meant was the the study assumed such because that's all the attacks that were happening. I remember reading that the studies were being conducted based on the battles that were happening at that time. Of course, that was from memory, but still. Willing to admit fault there, but my major point in that still stands. Not all AA Gunners nor Ships are created equal, when you have stats for the individual ship and crew it's best to use those.
In addition, I'm aware of the GFCS. Embarrassingly, it somehow actually slipped my mind that they were primarily AA computers (I was tired), but there is still some truth in what I said. In quite a few cases there was the issue of too-much-gun and too-many-targets for one computer to keep track of. Admittedly, the large ships didn't have it much better, however, they had much larger and competent dedicated anti-air teams. ...It's complicated, so I won't bother getting into it.
However, Radar Guided should not be confused with Radar Controlled. On the larger ships (such as is the case with our Red Team), you'd sometimes run into circumstances where the guns themselves listened 'directly to the computer' (as much as that was possible at the time, it was actually man-powered to some extent) and tracked from there. All the gun crew was responsible was loading the gun and pulling the trigger. Destroyers? Not so much. This would have required a more complicated system than what they had installed. At least, my last inspection of the USS Kidd did not leave me under the impression that this type of system was installed. (The Sumner and Gearing classes did have this system installed, which is why they were considered an improvement to the Fletcher even though they actually lost firerate. Compare the Sumner's 15rd/min x6 barrels to the Fletcher's 20rd/min x 5 barrels.)
2)
Few problems here. Firstly, there's a terminology misunderstanding going on here. I meant a carrier bomber that was heavy, not a heavy bomber. My bad. This should also solve the issue with carriers and plane weights. If it doesn't... I'm aware that weight isn't a problem for the carriers, it's a problem for the aircraft.
Secondly, you seem to be assuming that carriers commonly ran with strike aircraft spotted. This was simply not the case. I suppose that this is something I should have explained better. Carriers are, by their nature, warships of aggression. This is the reason why Japan is constantly under hot water with their helicopter destroyers/cruisers, people seem to think that they are Light Carriers (which they are by many respects, but actually can't reasonably service as one due to specific design choices made by the Japanese to ensure this). What I mean is that Carriers are mainly only useful when on the offense, preforming pretty poorly when on the defensive. Certainly, a single WW2 aircraft carrier could launch a wave of 15 planes in one sortie. Certainly. ...But they would have spent 3 hours setting that up. See, running any great distance under combat situations with a full flight deck of spotted planes was tantamount to suicide or at the very least a whole lot of ruined planes, should mother nature decide to throw a hissy fit, as she often did in the pacific. (There are reports of loaded planes coming loose during a mild storm and their bombs detonating on the flight deck... although, I can't remember which navy that was from). Given the territory, it was US Carrier practice to only carry 4 to 5 fighters spotted as replacement for their CAP, and possibly a Dive Bomber (without bombs) as a scout.
Getting planes from the hanger deck to the flight deck and then launching it took time. 25 minutes worth when using the catapult.
In order to conventionally take off, they had to clear the entire runway, which (as you may have assumed) was roughly 500ft in length. Now consider that Essex-class carriers used roughly half of their flight deck (including part of the runway) for fueling and arming operations. Not the best decision in the world, I know. But it was better than what the Japanese were doing, at the time. They simply didn't have 450ft of flight deck to give while under normal operation or even hot combat, since then they also needed to maintain space for recovery of damaged planes, hot reloading (which is not only dangerous, but requires more space), and prepping additional planes for launch. And this isn't even considering attempting to launch planes in foul weather, which requires even more space.
3)
You're failing to understand that this is an ambush. At 120nmi range, Red Team could do whatever they wanted, including maneuvering to line up with Blue Team. They would be practically invisible, after all. If the situation wasn't 'favorable' (say they couldn't reach the attack point), they wouldn't attack. Even under dire straights, pointless is pointless. Also, I already took into consideration an off angled approach. Red Team still managed to reach Blue Team after only one wave.
The thing is, there was a point for sending out the scout planes. If it worked, it would appear that there was Air Power in that direction. Air Power is a larger threat than surface combatants. At this point, it would merely be a matter of threat assessment. Would Blue Team try to flee towards the air power, or the Surface power. For that matter, who in their right mind would send just two ships after the might of Blue Team? No one, really. Not even the Japanese did that in the height of their desperation. Therefore, a logical mind would assume that the surface force was merely a decoy for a much more powerful force. A herder, so to say. Meaning, that a logical mind would assume they very well could be surrounded. Of course, that's the bluff, but Blue Team wouldn't know it was a bluff.
The thing is, I should have pointed out that I was playing to specific psychological weaknesses of TF38/58. See, this would appear to Blue Team to be a strategy very similar to an American strategy designed specifically to crush large forces, like Blue Team. We called it 'Stranglehold' (but we've called numerous tactics stranglehold over the years...). See, carriers and their escorts would come up from behind the target while heavy combat ships would sail along their sides, meanwhile the fleet's fastest heavy combatants would speed around the target to get in front of them, virtually surrounding the target. Optimally, the force would thin out to entirely surround them, but this was deemed impractical as that would take far too long. The Fast group would then turn straight in on the target. Naturally, the target would attempt to avoid them upon detection and change course... right into one of the heavy combatant groups riding the sides. Que convergence of all ships on the target. When done right, this tactic was particularly golden. Of course, there were many ways to screw it up, but in the eyes of the Americans it was practically foolproof. However, there was one flaw. The Fast Group was usually weaker than the heavy groups (the plan originally used light cruisers and destroyers for the fast group), and they were alone, having left the other groups behind to flank their Target. Naturally, that meant there was a way out of the stranglehold. Right through the fast group.
See where I'm going?
Alternatively, if you think I'm assuming too much, there is another way. A Three Point 'attack'. In this strategy, Red Team would divide into two and, again, use the planes as a decoy. It would proceed much in exactly the same way as the above plan, except that both ships would now be responsible for their own defenses... and any planes would now be divided in half, and Blue Team would have nowhere to run for the crucial hour it took for them to realize that the planes were a bluff. A theoretical increase in chance of 'victory' but has a much higher chance of sinking the San Diego, which I didn't like.
In addition, I'm aware of and already acknowledged a carrier's ability to operate their air wing at high speeds. It would just pretty much be suicidal in the above mentioned circumstances until they scattered, since they'd be running under the impression that there was more to Red Team than just 2 ships.
4)
Firstly, any gunner who cannot lead their target when they have an entire plotting team and one of the world's best fire control computers doing all the complicated work for them needs to either get their head in the game or resign from their position immediately. That's all I have to say on that matter.
Secondly, as many can attest, the range tables that the US Government provides for their gunnery are pretty much almost always bogus, this was true even back in WW2. Our cannons and guns fire farther, and much more accurately. The thing is, in today's time the UN would be screaming about us 'warmongering' if we hypothetically had a cannon that could shoot 200nmi. They were screaming at us when we reactivated the Iowa-class in the 80s, they're screaming now that we think we have the rail-gun working (which, btw, reaches out at touches a lot farther than the 200nmi they claim...). So, we tone it down a whole lot and understate our capabilities. Since we don't actually have to look good right now, that is. We have no one to intimidate that isn't already intimidated (or so they say. Personally, I think a little more intimidation could be a good thing. Key word is little.). Back then? Well, we were merely hiding information from the enemy. Anyone who needed to know, knew.
In fact, in WW2 a gunner aboard the Iowa had made a range/accuracy table for her that charted out to 80,000 yards, claiming that 95% of those rounds would drop within 850 feet of the target. He also noted that it went farther, but this was the minimum accuracy needed for combat. At 35,000yd, he had her accuracy as 95% in 157'. That's what having a highly trained and highly capable gun crew who really, really know their gun and love their ship can do for you. In Vietnam, report is that they had a load that allowed sub-MOA accuracy at 40nmi. That's putting every round in a circle the size of a school bus. Missouri and Wisky were targeting helmets in the Gulf War, and hitting them (of course, it helps when your shells leave 50 foot craters).
While I've read that report comparing the Iowa and the Bismark, I happen to strongly disagree with it. Off the top of my head, I think it'd be closer to 12.8% (once you factor in radar error).
5)
The dirty tricks provision was for Red Team. Blue Team wants to go home. Aside, Suicide Attacks are looked down upon in American culture except under certain circumstances (Operation Downfall amounted to nothing much more than one massive Suicide Attack, for instance). That being said, I actually did consider it. Firstly, you need to understand that suicide attacks actually make the planes easier to hit with the 5in'ers. Secondly, only San Diego would be vulnerable to such suicide attacks. As a matter of fact, when the Missouri was struck by kamikazi, supposedly the initial response of the crew was to start laughing that pilot had split in half. Black humor, I know, but it happened. Initially, it was reported that the kamikazi's 2000lb bomb failed to explode, this is the common version of the story. However, from my digging I found that the dry dock crew basically said 'oh yes it did'. What they claimed was that just the plane alone would not have managed to cause the damage that it did, instead saying that the damage was consistent with a 2000lb bomb. The American planes would not have this bomb, instead being comparable to relatively huge and very, very slow 10,000lb shells. Density and Speed makes a whole lot of difference when talking about the power of shells.
6)
In general, there are certain things that are just assumed. Tactical Victories are those that achieve immediate benefits. Pearl Harbor was one for the Japanese. Strategic Victories are those that achieve long term benefits. The initial battles of the Solomon Islands campaign (Guadalcanal) were such for the Americans, even though they were Tactical Victories for the Japanese. Decisive Victories are those that completely and utterly dominate your opponent, crushing their capability to retaliate. These are rare, but Midway was one for the Americans.
I suppose I should have clarified myself better on what constituted a victory. So, you have me there.
If Blue Team would have had their escorts, Red Team would have had escorts as well. In that case, this issue would have been a recreation of 'The Battleship's Last Hooyah', which was an American study conducted in the years following WW2 to see what would have happened if the Japanese Ten-Go force had been Americans facing off against the might of TF58, minus Battleship backup line (since, you know, 6 battleships, 2 Super Cruisers, 4 Heavy Cruisers, and 9 Destroyers would always beat 1 Battleship, 1 Light Cruiser, and 6 Destroyers). If you want to know, that Red Team did 'lose'... after sinking most of that Blue Team, including 9 carriers. The specifics of that 'battle' however are lost to me, unfortunately. While I know the result, I don't have the clearance to see the actual documents.
Alternatively, if going with the WW2 Carrier vs. Battleship Debate, you'd have TF38/58 (including escorts, minus battleships, but including 1 submarine for every 2 carriers) vs the Four Iowas, the 2 Alaskas, 2 Atlantas, some other Cruisers that I can't think of off the top of my head, 12+ Sumner/Gearing-class Destroyers, and 3+ Submarines (Each BB had a designated SS that they directly commanded and could tap for escort duty any time they needed them, wherever that sub was at the time. Unfortunately, Iowa's sunk and was never replaced. New Jersey had the Cavalla, Missouri had the Sealion II, and Wisconsin had the Flasher. Iowa had the Albacore.). That one would actually be fun to plot up, but impossible to actually make any valid conclusion for, except that it'd be one stupendous battle.
No worries. I enjoy this type of thing as well, assuming things remain civil and I can refrain from posting while drunk (doesn't happen that often, but when it does... hello, idiot!).
Yeah, I definitely understand how long it takes to type up one of these posts... definitely.
Appreciate the response. In the interest of keeping posts short and because most of that frankly went over my head, I'll just respond to the points I can. (Which means this'll be pretty short.) In particular, working under the constraints of this scenario, I obviously won't contest fundamental aspects of the scenario as laid out.
The point I was getting at with the time of flight bit wasn't that it'd make it difficult to lead - as you said, it certainly wouldn't be for a lead-computing FCS and its crew. The point was that the time of flight is time in which the target can change its velocity, which the FCS cannot have taken into account as the velocity change began after the round left the barrel. This means that the ship can be, at impact, anywhere in an area bounded only by its acceleration/speed and maneuverability, with the FCS having had no way to predict where, because in order to predict the target's movement within this area, it would require information only existent after firing. The round is headed for a point in that area, but with the round in the air, it's entirely up to the target to catch it.
Also, I rather doubt the 80,000 yard figure. Even under ideal projectile motion, with no air resistance, a projectile fired at 820m/s, 45 degrees, and from 20m above surface level would not reach 80,000 yards. With air resistance, even the AP projectiles of the Schwerer Gustav, with a doubtlessly higher ballistic coefficient simply thanks to the square-cube law if nothing else, had their range under ideal projectile motion cut in reality by 28%, and HE by 31%. Even generously assuming an equivalent 28% range loss to air resistance, the round would have to have a muzzle velocity of over 1000m/s to reach 80,000 yards.
That's about it - this actually ended up a lot longer than I hoped, mostly due (1st paragraph) to my inability to word things concisely and (2nd) to the lack of external ballistics data I could find for 16" projectiles. (Incidentally, any of this data - particularly the drag coefficient - if you have it would be appreciated by me and likely others simply out of interest and a dearth of available information.)
Edit: Further rambling, now about conduct rather than content of discussion, even though I really should've been asleep hours ago. No worries on civility I hope; I try to keep the detached tone pretty consistent - in any case, an uncivil discussion as lengthy as this and some others would degenerate into more incoherently "uncivil" and less "discussion" pretty quickly, I would imagine. As for drunk posting, there's not much I can say as I don't drink, other than living in a college town means I see firsthand that there are certainly worse decisions one can make while drunk...
Paragraph 2) Yeah, that's a pretty basic consideration when accounting for a moving target. The gunner pretty much has to guess. That's where instinct comes it, there are many snipers out there that can just 'feel' where there target is going to be... it's something like that with the big guns too.
Paragraphs 3 and 4) Actually, the Schwerer Gustav sort of stunk, as far as ballistics are concerned. A whole lot of power; but powder, the gun itself, and other severely hampering factors conspired against it.
Also, 1000m/s was relatively easy for the 16/50cal Mark 7 to achieve. The thing is, most of the reported data is for either 'Nominal' charge or 'Reduced' charge... they don't mention 'Minimal' Charge, 'High' Charge, or 'Overloaded' Charge. Unfortunately, the Iowa-class are still technically military assets, so they're not going to be talking about their finer points that much. Technically speaking, it's illegal for an American citizen (like myself) to put that type of data online. That really would be treason, if the Pratt and Whitney case a few years ago indicates anything. This is one of the reasons why the data for the 16in'ers are not on the internet, we may need them again and we don't want others (Specifically North Korea and China) to know what they're capable of. There are still enough 'big gun' admirals left in Washington Virginia (the Pentagon) to keep that type of data secret. (Of course, it helps that there's rumor circulating about that DARPA just recently [a few years back, cause the rumor's a little aged now] designed a 16in/75cal Mark 8 with the specific requirement that they be usable by the current Iowa-class, proving that there was still government interest in the old girls after all.)
Paragraph 5) I 'don't' drink either... but I'm smart enough to realize after the fact when a certain someone I know spikes my otherwise non-alcoholic beverages... (At the very least, I realize that I can't drive. I also realize that I can get away with slugging the [censored] as hard as I can.) That and I hate Long Island Iced Tea... I'm not going to fall for that one again. Hint: it's not tea. Of course, you may have known that. Me? Gullible, guilty as charged.
Fair enough then, nothing further to contest. Long Island Iced Tea isn't a name I probably would've recognized, although if it's drinkable and has a name I don't recognize, I usually just assume it's alcohol of some sort. (Well, that or an energy drink. But those tend to have distinctively "'90s teen TV commercial" names.)
And that has been it for this installment of "Why the US Navy will never be implemented into Kancolle, for fear of destabilizing the entire game balance. With your host, Grand_Zero." I hope you enjoyed the text-dump.
(P.S: I hope no one thinks I dislike Sakazaki Freddy's works. On the contrary, I like them a lot and find them very interesting.)
At face value, you'd be correct. However, there are a few problems here.
First off, I'm going to point out right away that that all of this is coming directly from my memory, which anybody who knows me at all can tell you isn't the best in the world. But I'm pretty sure I'm getting most of this right. Also, I was tired as I wrote this and it shows. Especially as it drags on. I had a busy day, forgive me. Someone like GAU-8/A would likely provide better details.
Sorry this took awhile, but the more I read the more nonsense I found so the essay ended up being pretty huge. Iâve broken it down as best I can by category.
Reflationary text wall
On AA effectiveness: Quit trying to confuse and obstruct the point. The navy wanted to try and roughly gauge how effective its AA was statically speaking. It chosen measure was the logical and standard âaverage rounds per killâ which it obtained by study of a large number of actual shot downs in the field during the time period specified. These occurred under a number of circumstances and thus give a good idea of the average effectiveness of AA over a wide envelope.
The study in question also focused on the fast carrier task forces with the best ships, so any arguments it was diluted by âless effectiveâ guns is nonsense as all DD by 1944 had radar directed guns as did carriers and cruisers. Also Iâm highly inclined to simply dismiss your numbers as the study I cited can be found online and is likewise widely quoted in other works (unsurprising since itâs a primary source). I have never seen the numbers youâre giving for individual ships quoted anywhere and in fact Iâve never even heard of a study done on individual ships period.
The reason for that is blindingly obvious with even a half a secondâs thought; namely it pretty much never occurred that only one ship was firing on any given aircraft. Everyone with even the barest hint of an angle on it was blasting away at max RoF. Thus the idea you can assign a âshells per killâ number to any individual ship is almost automatically discredited. Sure maybe Iowa did only fire 100 shells on average during an engagement, but the two DDs beside her and the cruiser trialing half a mile behind were also blasting away and added another 400 to the mix. And of course all five ships will claim they were the ones that killed it and when they get to bragging about it theyâll add it âonly took a hundred rounds!â
The only way to gain a real feel for the kill rate is to look at the entirety of a task force or fleet, IE everyone actually shooting at the incoming planes. The navy, having actual experts, of course did exactly that when it sought to gauge the overall effectiveness of AA fire. It also chose a formation that was fairly consistent with more or less uniform fire control equipment across the board and was centralized with good record keeping (the fast carrier task forces). The idea that some ships within this fleet were somehow performing five times better than average with functionally identical fire control systems is rather laughable.
The numbers cited are as accurate as youâre going to get, nothing youâve said changes that in the slightest, but I can see why youâd desperately want to try and wiggle out of them given how utterly damning they are. Though funnily enough theyâre actually probably overly generous for this scenario for several reasons.
-The aircraft being destroyed in the study were Japanese with most of them being consequently very lightly built and with few survivability features. Out of all aircraft in the war they were probably the most vulnerable to fragmentation and small caliber damage. This would almost certainly lowered the number of rounds per kill compared to if theyâd been shooting at far more rugged US carrier aircraft. -The study was conducted in late 44 early 45 by which point the Japanese pilot training had already catastrophically deteriorated. Most of the pilots being killed wouldâve been considered nowhere near competent to fly in combat by US standards of the time. This almost certainly resulted in bungled approaches, less confidence in maneuvering hard (evasion), and poor coordination of attacks by groups. None of this was true of US aircraft crews and better flown aircraft would surely raise the number of require shells as well. (This is excluding kamikazes which the study actually felt different enough to list separate estimates for) -US tactics by this point had evolved to include actual SEAD activity during air strikes, which the Japanese didnât do at all really. In the absence of any air threat Hellcats and other fighters were specifically armed and designated to attack the target ships exposed AA weaponry to suppress flak via rockets and machine guns just ahead of strike aircraft. By late 44-45 the US air groups had become extremely proficient at these sorts of coordinate multi-pronged attacks. Indeed even during attacks on very large fleets where the sheer number of barrels ought to have more than evened out even a few times advantage in individual effectiveness the losses were very minor.
Itâs true and fair to say that US aircraft never dealt with AA as effective as what their own ships had, but itâs also equally true and fair to say that late war US ships never dealt with anything like the swarm of well-coordinated, expertly flown, heavy built and armed aircraft a late war US carrier air group could deploy. What they did have to try and deal with though were Kamikazes and they failed, repeatedly, to do so.
Kamikazes were ineptly flown and often plunging straight toward a target through the fire of a dozen ships, it was rare that more than a comparative handful made it through the veritably wall of fighters deployed against them, and yet they still got through; over and over again they got through. This was the real test of late war AA against attackers bent on pressing home an attack and it could not stop them. The only defense was more and more fighters pushed further and further out because it was blindly obvious that even with all the late war AA techno-wizardry at the USNs disposal a simple fact hadnât change: flak canât stop a determined attacker.
This is no shock; flak has never stopped air attack. It complicates the attack by forcing a more careful approach and possibly scaring off some attackers reducing the attacks effectiveness and, over the long term, can contribute to attrition, but it canât stop them and never has. It didnât stop the blitz, it didnât stop the 8th air force, it didnât stop the Kamikazes, and it wonât stop the swarm from a fast carrier task force.
This is likewise borne out by the studies as compared to the fleets CAPs the number of kills contributed by AA is comparatively pathetic pittance. A few hundreds compared to thousands scored by the fighters. Just another example of how worthless large surface vessels had become as even in their supposed primary late war role of anti-aircraft duty they were utterly eclipsed by carriers. Frankly by 1944 itâs debatable if the US even needed anything besides DDs and carriers. About the only argument cruisers and battleships had was shore bombardment, but escort carriers with a bunch of Wild/Hellcats and Avengers were probably just as good thanks to the USNâs compete air dominance, were cheaper, and the fighters also made them probably ten times as useful for anti-aircraft warfare.
On your nonsense about carrier limitations. Firstly, a Carrier can only support so many planes in the air at a single time
âSo manyâ is dozens. Just as one example I happened to come across recently during the battle of Leyte Gulf Enterprise deployed 38 planes in about an hour; 23 at 6AM another 15 at 6:45AM. As another example Hiryuâs first counter attack sortie at Midway was 24 aircraft launched together as one strike.
Another example is the slaughter of Yamato which is illustrative and quite relevant to this farce. The US began launching aircraft from eight carriers against the Yamatoâs formation at 10:00, it was a two hour flight to the target area, and the massacre was completed by 14:30. The total raid strength was about 385 planes. Eight carriers thus deployed almost 50 planes a piece in less than two and a half hours.
Your numbers are thus utter rubbish and on the order of about ten times too low. This isnât shocking given your clear bias, but it is pretty laughable given its sheer galling obviousness given how trivial it is to just go look at reports of the sorts of raids that were launched in a given time frame.
Secondly, they can only launch very few aircraft per sortie, and it can take up to half an hour to launch another sortie.
See above 40 planes in about an hour. A forty plane raid is not âvery fewâ to anything afloat, itâs even less small when half a dozen other carriers are doing it as well. I have no idea where youâre pulling this â2 planes per sortieâ nonsense from, but itâs clearly not from reality since large strikes of dozens of aircraft at once from a single carrier where absolutely routine.
Thirdly, WW2 Carriers cannot be at full speed while launching or receiving planes.
Incorrect as noted by another poster, they perfectly capable of flight ops at near, if not at flank speeds. Launching is probably barely slowed at all to be honest since flying a plane off the deck at into a slightly higher headwind is no impediment whatsoever. Iâll concede that recovery at such high speeds would likely be slowed though, but that barely matters here.
Fourthly, Carrier Plane flight patterns are predictable. Very predictable. Especially at short range to the carrier.
Irrelevant if you have no means to exploit this.
Fifthly, Carriers are extremely weak in a Melee and incapable of sinking anything larger than a destroyer on their own.
Irrelevant, youâll never reach them to âmeleeâ.
Sixthly, their Radar units are generally only as good as their counterpart Battleship's, including AA radar. This gave them surface detection out to about 22nmi against a battleship sized target or 26nmi against an Aircraft Carrier.
Irrelevant, surface radar will never be a factor in this engagement.
Seventhly, in WW2 their CAP was only effective out to about ~40nmi (eyeball accurate detection range). Outside of that, they're practically blind.
Incorrect, by late war the US had developed a comparatively very advanced integrated air defense network that leveraged multiple radars to provide wide ranging coverage and fighter direction. This is again irrelevant though as CAP radius hardly matters against battleships; although the fact all those cap fighters are now freed up to smother it with machine gun and rocket fire certainly is.
That second sentence though would seem to imply you think this is the extent of their detection radius against anything coming at them. I want to assume thatâs just poorly worded and youâre not suggesting that a carrier air wing with surface radar equipped scout planes with speeds of 200+ mph and ranges of hundreds of miles canât locate surface vessels outside a radius of less than 50 milesâŠ
No wait, based on later parts of your post you actually seriously seem to be arguing that the battleships actually have a detection advantage. Holy hell thatâs dumb.
See I was assuming this was actually a âfair scenarioâ where both sides know the other is out there, are under orders to try and kill them, and start off at a distance and then try to find and engage the other. Based on the nonsense your post devolves into its pretty clear your envisioned scenario is more like: -The battleship has used a teleportation device to arrive insanely close to the carriers at like 100 miles away in order to detect its planes, so for some magical reason it WONâT have to steam through several hundred miles of constant air attacks. (well the reason is pretty clear actually, your desperately trying to rig this to support your ridiculous original assertion, but I digress) -The carriers are totally ignorant of this and picking their butts launching useless CAPs and operating as normal while the battleship is steaming forward at 33 knots hell bent on kamikazing into the fleet -You've then gone and assigned absolute retards to lead the TF38 while assuming the Battleship is apparently captained by a psychic
Yes this makes sense, totally. Oh wait, no it doesnât, actually itâs really, really dumb and totally rigged to try and produce the result you want, not one that makes any sense. Itâs like putting two guys in a phone booth one with a full length assault rifle and the other with a four inch switch blade and then crowing about how the knife is clearly a viable weapon against the gun because the knife guy manages to win the ensuing fight.
Itâs fairly telling really your entire argument hinges on having used magic to position the battleship at virtually spitting distance from the carriers at the very start and then having the carriers act like morons. Itâs even more hilarious that even WITH this bit of hand waving it STILL fails utterly assuming the carriers arenât actually clinically retarded as I shall shortly show.
First off letâs destroy the first daft assumption; your nonsense about the battleship magically knowing where the carriers are before the carriers find it. The standard scout by this time period is an Avenger with a radar that can spot a battleship sized target at ranges on the order of 35-40 nautical miles. In this silly scenario these are what would be up, not a damn fighter CAP, well unless you assign the carriers morons for commanders who upon losing their entire escort and detection screen take no steps to increase observation flights and attempt to use fighters to gain early warning of any approaching contacts. I'm assuming the carrier crews aren't morons so they do deploy extra scouts and these aircraft easily spot the battleship long before itâs even CLOSE to gun range and hover just outside of its AA range for hours and hours on end providing constant updates on its course. Letâs be insanely generous and assume that battleship has magically gained a rough idea of the carrierâs location at the same time because for some insane reason despite zero air threat the carriers are maintaining a CAP nearby to themselves and itâs detected this.
It turns toward them and tries to charge at flank speed to close.
The carriers then ring up flank speed as well and start steaming to generate maximum separation. (because again not being captained by morons here there response to a fast battleship hurtling toward them flat out in attempt to force a surface action isn't to mildly alter course and keep steaming in such a way as to allow it to intercept them, but shocking[i/] it's to turn away and ring up full speed to keep the range open!) They start gaining this easily because they have continuous monitoring of the battleshipâs course, while it has ZERO idea where they are or what theyâre doing. The hanger is ordered to begin preparing a large strike while the carriers sail away, opening the range on their blind opponent. The scout planes are periodically replaced maintaining a constant track on the battleship, the battleship's own scouts are long dead by a pair of hellcats and having confirmed that they were float planes and NOT being utter morons the carriers instantly know they're from the battleship and indicate nothing more. Also not being morons they don't instantly assume that the lone battleship is part of some super elaborate trap and turn back toward for no sane reason, they continue away from it at flank speed deploying extra scouts to search for anything else.Still letâs assume that the battleships commander is psychic and despite having no way to see the carriers manages a perfect stern chase at 32 knots. Why 32? Because thatâs San Diegoâs top speed. The Independence class is 31.5 knots and attempting a stern chase with a .5 knot speed advantage is an exercise in pure futility. Letâs just go with the 120 nmi number for initial contact you pulled out of your rear, but now the carriers arenât brain dead so their radar scouts have detected the battleship at pretty much the same ranges. The New Jersey needs to close to 20 nmi to reach the extreme edge of 16 inch gun range (I'm not buying your supposedly classified crap that magically extends gun range, sorry. Even if the rubbish about it still being classified you're spouting is true the performance of other guns of the era isn't and the commonly cited numbers for it align quite well with all those other guns, and are totally against the nonsense you're spewing), so roughly 100 nm needs to be reeled in.With a closure rate of .5 nmi per hour it will take toughly 200 hours to close 100 nmi, so hell cut it in half and make it 50 mni left to close before they turn away for all I care, it makes no damn difference. The result is the same as itâs it effectively impossible as an Iowa could not sustain flank speed for that long, never mind San Diego. This is of course why Carrier always wins in the end. It is impossible for a gun ship to close range on a fleet carrier that has ANY warning whatsoever.Again not being morons the carriers have spent all this time launching more scouts which have failed to find anything else with hundreds of miles of them. It's soon obvious there is nothing else, just one terminally stupid battleship. The carriers thus begin massing a strike package and staging it onto the deck. Letâs assume the high speed slows this somewhat and it takes several hours, itâs not like it matters, theyâve got DAYS if need be.The game plan is Yamato Strike 2 Bominâ Boogaloo. Since weâve got more carriers to play with then the fleet that murdered Yamato and weâll be launching at a higher speed than normal letâs say the commander is conservative and decides to only sortie about 25 aircraft from each carrier roughly split 8/8/8 between Fighter, TB, and DB. Letâs also say that because of the speed this deployment is unusually slow and takes a full hour to fly off due to the high speed launch, which will be made at 30 knots to match a known launch speed. Once away strike package forms up and orbits above the carrier group, within a bit over an hour or so about 450 aircraft are now aloft, and every single one is loaded for an anti-ship attack.Pants shitting is not only advisable, but encouraged for death is now inevitable and it might help loosen your anus a bit for the pounding itâs about to take, for the Fast Carrier Task Force doesnât believe in lube and it wonât be gentle.At this point pretty much everything else in your post is well and truly irrelevant fantasy.With no fighter cover whatsoever the strike package arrives at the target ships after a very short flight and simply forms up and orbits out of range of AA fire, again like Yamato, waiting to amass critical raid density. Once several hundred aircraft are in position all around the âfleetâ the slaughter commences. The entire package descends from all sides in waves. Hellcats and Corsairs lead the attack raking the decks with thousands of .50 cal slugs and barrages of rockets. Gunners are cut to ribbons, radar aerials shred, gun directors riddled. Some aircraft are hit, but theyâve done their job AA is suppressed or shooting at them.San Diegoâs armor is actually so thin real itâs entirely possible rocket fire actually riddles her deck and might disables critical ship systems. Itâs known to have disabled destroyers with only slightly smaller size with only slightly less protection. Regardless if sheâs seriously addled by rocket fire or not sheâll be dead shortly anyway.With AA either suppressed or exchanging fire with the suppressing fighters the dive bomber coming from above and Torpedo bombers coming in from both sides arrive close behind. They approach largely unmolested and press their attacks in close. The Helldivers add further 20mm cannon and rocket fire during their approaches adding additional suppression as they close to drop. By this point US naval aviators are the best in the world and at this raid density they certainly score multiple hits.San Diego has no underwater protection and little mass or armor, but seeing as sheâs fairly skinny torpedo hits are probably more likely than bombs. Late war US aircraft torpedoes have warheads approaching the destructive power of a 1942 long lance. San Diego takes one or two and like the overgrown destroyer she is, is promptly crippled. With so many planes swarming and now dead in the water overkill quickly takes over and sheâs probably blown to bits.Most of the attack will focus on the Iowa though and while tough sheâs not quite Yamato tough and in particular her lack of bulk and somewhat poorly considered underwater protection will make her more vulnerable to torpedoes. Her gunners probably claim a few more of the torpedo bombers then either the fighters or dive bombers, but she eats numerous fish in turn which open her up and slashes her speed. Sheâs probably also taken numerous bomb hits by now too which had pounded the shit out of her and reduced any defensive fire to largely ineffective local control.Overkill once more sets in and sheâs buried under an avalanche of bombs and torpedoes. I doubt the massacre takes much more than an hour at most.In the end between them I suspect the might claim 30-40 planes (some not downed, but so shot up theyâre retired) not bad being about 3 or 4 times what Yamatoâs entire battlegroup did, but hardly any kind of fair trade for a battleship.
I get it, seriously, you have a giant woody for battleships; it's a travesty they've gone extinct, the tech to make them viable again is just around the corner, etc, etc. I've seen this all before I know they're sooo much cooler then Aircraft Carriers, but try to divert a bit of the blood going to that big gun boner back up to your brain and face some facts: there hasn't been a battleship built in 70 years. There have been plenty of carriers.
There's probably a reason for that, it likely doesn't involve every navy on earth being stupid. The battleship was completely and utterly obsolete by 1944 frankly the idea one of them could steam at 20 carriers and do anything beside die is so stupid that I feel dumber having had to explain why such is so.
Look, I'm not even going to bother responding to most of that since: 1) I feel a touch dumber just having to read your comments, so that feeling is mutual and 2) It's become plain and clear to the entire internet that neither of us will ever agree with the other on this topic, so continued argument is entirely degrading to the community. I don't know about you, but I happen to like the Danbooru community, so I'll politely refrain from doing that.
Instead, I'm going to point out that I wasn't contesting the irrefutable fact that Carriers have become the kings of the oceans since WW2 and will remain so for the next 'few' (30+) years, anyone who can't understand that is hopeless. However, like any good game of chess (metaphorical comparison), any good King needs an equally good Queen, and the (modern) Battleship fills that niche very nicely given its already present defensive capabilities.
And now for another installment of Grand_Zero's Fleet Analysis, or "Why the US Navy will never be implemented into Kancolle, for fear of destabilizing the entire game balance. With your host, Grand_Zero."
Atlanta and the Fletchers got added to the game btw. Im just saying :v
I'll freaking kill you!Back at Yokosuka after taking medium damageHer armaments were:
13 x 25mm triple mount turrets
9 x 25mm single mount turrets
36 x 13mm single mount turrets
For a total of 84 gunsCome on, calm down.Alright, now you're overflowing with firepower....Interesting...
Then let's give it a try...Starting with a Type 21 radar
A Type 22 radar on each side
And also a Type 13 radarAfter it's all done, this is the new anti-air boss
air defense cruiserMaya-sama!It's pointless to upgrade the main guns and torpedo... this is far more important.The Anti-Air BossThis is age of anti-air battles.This is the reason for her over-the-top AA attack value in the game!You're removing my #3 turret!? Why!? My sisters are getting torpedo upgrades so why am I being weakened!?If you leave it to us, we can make you the strongest among the Takao-class...
You'll have top class performance among all the cruisers out there.Four 12cm single high angle mount turrets were removed and replaced with Six 12.7cm twin high angle mount turrets.